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ABSTRACT: Since the 1973{74 oil price increases, Saudi Arabia has embarked a major 
program of infrastructure expansion. The purpose of this program is to alleviate the many bot-
tlenecks hindering increases in the country's non-oil productive sectors. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the effectiveness of the country's infrastructure program. In particular has 
the Saudi Arabian government's investment program been successful in reducing inflationary 
pressures and hence in creating an environment conducive to sustained expansion of the non-
-oil private sector economy? On the other hand, has the government's massive investment in in-
frastructure simply created an additional inflationary source of aggregate demand for the 
kingdom's scarce domestic resources? 
The main findings of the study are that the country's infrastructure led growth has been suc-
cessful in achieving its main aim: the reduction in structural sources of inflationary pressures 
in the non-oil sectors. In this respect, the government's strategy began paying fairly respectable 
growth rates, even during periods of slack oil revenues. It still remains to be see however if past 
infrastructure investments will be able to sustain the growth momentum built up in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. 
INTRODUCTION 
The possibility that the resulting supply side effects of public sectorinvest-
ment in infrastructure can reduce inflationary pressures has long intrigued 
(*)Final version: November 1989. 




economists. Tersely put, increases in investment in infrastructure, while per-
haps inflationary in the initial construction stage, may ultimately result in 
reductions in the price level through the elimination of bottlenecks and the 
resulting increase in the supply of goods and services. In particular, invest-
ment in such areas as transportation and energy, thereby reducing the costs of 
commercial production, appear to have the potential of being particularly ef-
fective in this regard. It follows that if a stable relationship between increases 
in infrastructure and reductions in the cost of production exist, the public sec-
tor in many developing countries would have a powerful tool at its disposal to 
achieve high growth with only limited inflationary pressures. Investment in 
infrastructure, therefore is seen by its advocates as creating a wide spectrum 
of newly profitable areas of investment for the private sector. This phenome-
non has been stressed by Hirschman (1958) in his unbalanced growth strategy. 
Perhaps even more importantly, infrastructure's contribution to price stabil-
ization in most likely to result in a shifting of investment from short run in-
flation hedges to longer run capacity increasing forms of asset accumulation. 
The net result should ceteris paribus result in a higher over all long growth 
rate. 
Interestingly enough, despite the compelling attractiveness of the in-
frastructure led development strategy, no country case studies had, until quite 
recently ( 1) been undertaken to determine its effectiveness in reducing domes-
tic inflationary pressures. Because it has both the willingness and the means 
to undertake a program of infrastructure led development , Saudi Arabia 
provides an ideal case study for examining the effectiveness ofa development 
strategy built on massive increases in infrastructure (Loonely, R.E. and Fre-
deriksen, P.C. 1985). Not only is the government committed to a strong ideol-
ogy of free market capitalism stressing development of private enterprise, but 
has by design maintained and supported a policy of encouraging the private 
sector to take advantage of the profitable opportunities opened up by public 
sector investment. This policy package includes business freedom, low taxes, 
(l)J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., 1983. Unfortunately Rosser's study does however have several 
limitations: he uses the consumer price index, which includes mainly price controlled staple 
goods, and his measurement of infrastructure is proxied by Real Estate Development Fund and 
Agricultural Loan Bank loans, both of which contain a high precentage of subsidy payments. 
These subsidies are not necessarily associated in any regular manner with the construction of 
fixed capital (infrastructure) assets. 
.,.,_ 
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low tariffs, no national debt, relatively stable prices, an elaborate industrial 
subsidy program (subsidized loans, low fees for industrial estates etc.), min-
imum restrictions on the inflow of capital and emigrants. With the notable ex-
ception of petroleum, a few oil-related industries, and certain manufacturing 
activities planned by the government and financed by state oil revenues, all 
traditional economic activities are privately-owned and operated (Amuzegar, 
J., 1974). 
In terms of their commitment, the Saudi authorities have spent more on in-
frastructure in the last fifteen years than any country in history over a similar 
time period. Since 1970 when the country initiated its first development plan, 
the government with the completion of the Third Plan in 1985 had allocated 
approximately 375 billion riyals to development infrastructure (during most 
of this period the exchange rate was around 3.5 Rls to the U.S. dollar). 
The purpose of the analysis below, therefore, is to assess the effectiveness 
country's infrastructure program has had on alleviating bottlenecks impeding 
the country's development. Has the Saudi Arabian government's strategy of 
infrastructure led investment been successful in reducing inflationary pres-
sures and hence in creating an environment conducive to sustained expansion 
of the non-oil private sector economy? Or on the other hand has the govern-
ment's massive investment in infrastructure simply created an additional 
demand for the kingdom's scarce domestic resources without providing the 
additional consumer goods (especially in the non-traded categories) needed to 
reduce inflationary pressures? 
STRUCTURAL CHARA TERISTICS 
Saudi Arabia's geography has created the need for heavy investments in 
infrastructure, especially in transportation. ,The country is characterized by 
immense diversity and, until at least the period of the post- 1973/74 oil boom, 
was fragmented geographically and economically (2). In general, because of 
its relatively small population the kingdom suffers from small market size 
which denies many local producers the advantages of economies of scale 
(2)An excellent recent survey of the Saudi Arabian economy is given in Ali D. Johany, 
Michael Berne and J. Wilson Mixon, 1986. 
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(Matwally, M.M., 1979).Historically, since producers were dispersed geo-
graphically, they suffered from relatively high transportation and com-
munication costs which in tum severely limited the opportunities for domes-
tic trade. These elements have all worked to reduce the private rate of return 
on many types ofinvestment (Turner, L., and Bedore, J.M., 1979), thereby en-
hancing the potential for an active government role. 
In addition, despite diversification the Kingdom has tended to depend to a 
large degree on oil products, and perhaps the pilgrimage, for foreign exchange 
earnings. As such, the country is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of external 
economic developments that, in tum, create the need for government interven-
tion. 
On the positive side, of course, the development of hydrocarbons has 
meant that the country has not had to deplete available resources which could 
have been diverted to capital fonnation to finance oil imports. In addition, the 
kingdom differs from most developing countries in that the economy is 
generally more open, so that a priori one would expect financial crowding out 
of private investment to be relatively less of a problem to the extent that 
domestic residents can have access to foreign financial markets when there 
is an excess demand for credit (3). 
On the other hand, being open to the world economy subjects the Saudi 
economy to movements in world prices. Especially, during the 1970s world 
wide inflation made it extremely difficult for the Saudi authorities to eliminate 
domestic inflationary pressures (Looney, R.E. 1984). 
It could also be argued that because of the small size of the country, the 
government is more able to dominate the economy and, thereby, total domes-
tic capital fonnation. In fact, one striking pattern characterizing Saudi 
Arabia's development has been the rapid expansion of government expendi-
tures ( 4). In particular, government investment as a percent of total investment 
increased from slightly under 7 percent in 1960 to 42.9 percent in 1965, 53.3 
percent(in 1970, and 72.6 percent in 1980. The public sector's share in invest-
(3) The workings of these financial flows have been extensively analyzed by Rodney 
Wilson, (1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1986). 
( 4) Unless otherwise indicated, all economic data are taken from Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency Annual Report, various issues. Nominal values are deflated with the non-oil price index 
(1970 = 1.00). 
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ment has declined somewhat to 54.2 percent due to the oil price declines. 
Similarly, public sector consumption increased from slightly over 20 percent 
oftotalconsumptionin 1960to 36.5 percent in 1965,46.9 percent in 1975 and 
50.4 percent in 1982. Again, this share fell slightly to 45.1in1985 due to the 
decline in oil revenues. 
The net result is that the expenditures of the public sector have risen as a 
percent of total expenditures from around 20 percent in 1960 to slightly under 
50 percent in 1985. 
This growth in the government sector has apparently not been at the ex-
pense of the private sector with overall private sector investment expanding 
at slightly under 9.8 percent per annum over the 1965-85 period. 
In general, therefore, despite the huge fall in receipts, overall government 
spending has declined by a fairly small amount since the early 1980s. Within 
the total, however, there has been a steady increase in current expenditure and 
a decrease in spending on new infrastructural projects. The main brunt of the 
post 1982 contraction has therefore fallen on construction contractors, and the 
problems they have felt have been fed through to importers and manufacturers 
of building materials and equipment and finally to all other sectors of the 
economy (Field, M., 1986). 
THE ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to the Hirschman image of infrastructure's role in the develop-
ment process, a broad spectrum of viewpoints exist, some of them diametri-
cally opposed to one another. There is a consensus, however, as to the need for 
basic infrastructure facilities. Ultimately infrastructure must be a limiting fac-
tor without which no development process could take place even if other 
development-inducing factors were present. However opinions as to in-
frastructure's precise role in economic deveiopment beyond this point differ 
greatly. 
Some economists like Glover and Simon (1975) take the view that the role 
of infrastructure is simply to relieve "tensions" generated by supply and 
demand patterns as well as bottleneck pressures. Another (smaller) group of 
economist lead by F. Voigt (1974) maintain that alterations in infrastructure 
exert a follow-on influence on regional macroeconomic and social processes. 
Thus autonomous or induced changes in the stock of infrastructure produce 
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external effects in the area serviced (5). 
The majority of economists seem to take a middle position between these 
two more or less diametrically opposed views. Some of them consider in-
frastructure to be a function of the level of socio-economic development; in 
other words, the more economically and socially backward a potential 
development region, the stronger the impulses emanating from improvements 
in the stock of infrastructure. Other feel that the reciprocal relationship bet-
ween changes in infrastructure and socio-economic development is such that 
the problem of cause and effect is not open to solution. 
However, most economists agree that if infrastructure investments, labor 
market planning and educational planning are unconnected, they are likely to 
yield conflicting results or, at any rate, outcomes that could eventually lead 
to undesirable situations. 
IMPACT OF INCREASED INFRASTRUCTURE ON DOMESTIC INFLA-
TION 
Operationally, the impact of infrastructure on inflation in Saudi Arabia is 
modeled by a blending of the Hirschman/Voigt and Glover/Simon views of 
the impacts stemming from the infrastructure development process. If in-
frastructure plays a role similar to that invisaged by Hirschman and Voigt, we 
should expect to find the resulting potential increase in the rate of return on 
various commercial activities inducing the private sector to inflation in the 
short run, over time, this should result in a closing of the inflationary gap 
created by the infusion of purchasing power associated with the construction 
phase of the infrastructure expansion program. 
On the other hand, if the Glover and Simon view of the role of infrastruc-
ture is more appropriate in explaining private sector behavior, we would ex-
pect the.private sector's expectations of future government actions, including 
likely extensions of the country's infrastructure to play a predominant role in 
shaping its decisions to expand output and or investment. However, the new 
higher level of output may, depending on the way its financed, result in an 
over-expansion of the money supply neutralizing the longer run anti-inflation-
(5) An empirical identification of both the Hirschman/Voigt and Glover/Simon patterns is 
given in Robert Looney and P. Frederksen, 1981. 
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ary effect of the induced expansion of infrastructure. 
In the model that follows attempts to incorporate the inflationary effects of 
infrastructure implicit in both the Hirschman/Voigt and Glover/Simon ap-
proaches. 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
Much of the confusion as to the role of infrastructure in the development 
process stems from the fact that few countries have statistics as to the value and 
composition of their stock of infrastructure . Saudi Arabia is no exception. 
In particular, official Saudi data on government investment contains both in-
frastructural and non-infrastructural type expenditures. Conceivably the cost 
reducing effect of the infrastructure component of government investment 
could be offset by the (inflationary) crowding out of private sector activity 
stemming from the the non-infrastructural component. To avoid these poten-
tial problems it is necessary to separate out and estimate the independent ef-
fects of the different categories of public investment. Since the raw data itself 
does not allow these distinctions to be made, one way of getting around this 
problem is to develop alternative proxies for infrastructural and non-infra-
structural components. The basic assumption underlying these proxies is that 
infrastructure investment is an ongoing process that moves slowly over time 
and cannot be changed very rapidly. The first of the two approaches takes the 
trend level of real public sector investment (GINPLT) as representing the 
longtenn or infrastructural component and argues that this should have a posi-
tive effect on gross real private investment; deviations from the trend 
(GINPDLT) are assumed to represent non-infrastructural investment (6). 
A final factor that needs to be taken into account is the potential problem 
of real or physical crowding out. It is a well-accepted proposition that in Saudi 
Arabia absorptive capacity has been a problem, particularly in the early oil 
boom years (Looney, R.E., 1982). By definition, public sector expenditure can 
result in crowding out if it utilizes physical and financial resources that would 
( 6) The trend in expenditures was estimated using a linear regression with time. Expected 
expenditures were calculated as 
EXP (t)= a+ b [XP( t-1)]. 
with the parameters a and b estimated over the period 19'60-1985. 
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otherwise go to the private sector. Furthermore, the financing of public sec-
tor investment, whether through taxes, issuance of debt or inflation will lower 
the resources available for the private sector and thus depress private invest-
ment activity. These effects should not be a major factor in Saudi Arabia, 
however, given the government's resource base, lack of debt and inflation. 
Operationally a negative sign on the non infrastructural term [GINP (t) -
GINPLT (t)] depicted below as (GINPDL T) can be assumed to reflect crowd-
ing out of private sector investment due to excessive allocations to non-
infrastructural uses. 
A variant on this approach is to make a distinction between types of public 
investment on the basis of whether or not investment is expected. Again it is 
assumed that expected public investment, GINPE, reflects the allocations of 
public investment for infrastructure, while the effects of unanticipated invest-
ment (the difference between actual and expected levels of government in-
vestment (GINPELT)) may result in crowding out of private sector activity 
and hence increased inflationary pressures. 
STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
The model used to examine the differential impact of government expendi-
tures o'n inflation in Saudi Arabia incorporates the considerations outlined 
above: 
1. In particular the three proxies for infrastructure investment outlined 
were tested to determine if in fact the results obtained were sensitive 
to the manner in which infrastructural investment was defined. 
2. The inflationary impact of non-infrastructural components of govern-
ment investment was estimated by including a short run measure of 
transitory government investment (GEXPT). For the level of govern-
ment investment GINP, this consisted of changes in real investment 
from one year to the next (DGINP); for trend in government investment, 
this consisted of each year's deviation from 'the trend; and for the ex-
pected level government investment this consisted of unexpected 
government (the difference between actual government investment, 
GINP and expected government investment GINPE). Expected gov-
ernment investment was estimated in the same manner as expected in-
flation. 
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3. The impact of world price movements on the Saudi Arabian price level 
was included to reduce any biases stemming from the period of world 
inflation occuring in the mid to late 1970s. Since Saudi Arabia does not 
publish figures on the price of imports, this variable was proxied by the 
International Monetary Fund's industrial countries' export price index. 
This index was lagged one year (INFWL) to allow changes in import 
prices to work themselves through the domestic cost structure. 
4. Inflation is also assumed to be a function of inflationary expectations 
(NODFE). This factor was proxied by regressing the non-oil price 
deflater on its value in the previous year, and using each year's 
predicted value in the regression equation. 
5. The potential impact of excess money balances on the non-oil price 
deflater was treated by including the money supply (Ml) in the regres~ 
sion equation. 
6. The reduction in inflationary pressures stemming from increased real 
supplies of goods and services was proxied by non-oil GDP (NOXNP). 
For a basis of comparison, the inflationary impact of two other types of 
government expenditure, government consumption (GCNP) and military ex-
penditures (GME), were also examined. Since these expenditures tend to 
create demand and not be supply augmenting, their values (and those of their 
transitory components) were assumed to be positive. 
Finally, to test the generality of the model regressions were performed 
using both the non-oil GDP deflater (NODF) and the consumer price index 
(CPI) (7). 
Summarizing the above in equation form (with expected signs): 
INF= f[INFE ( + ), INFWL (+),Ml ( + ), NOXNP (-), GEXP (- + ), GEXPT ( +)] 
where INF =the non - oil GDP deflater (and the consumer price index); 
INFE =expected increase in the non-oil GDP deflater (and the con-
sumer price index); 
INFWL =export price index of the industrialized countries 
(lagged one year); 
(7) Estimations were made using the Cochraine-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure. This 
procedure transforms the data (generating a variable RHO) to eliminate serial correlation. 




= the'money supply as defined by the International Monetary 
Fund; 
GEXP = government expenditures. 
Three types of government expenditures were examined: 
GINP = government investment (mainly infrastructure) 
GCNP = government consumption 
GME = military expenditures. 
If our assumptions concerning infrastructure are correct, we would expect the 
sign on infrastructure investment to be negative, whereas it is assumed that 
government consumption and military expenditure by contributing to demand 
but not supply would have a positive sign (or be statistically insignificant). 
To test the generality of our results, several different specifications of govern-
ment investment were tested: 
GINPL T = the linear trend in government investment 
GINPE = the expected level of government investment 
GINPDL T = deviations from the trend in government investment 
DGINP = changes in government expenditure 
GINPELT = unexpected changes in government expenditures 
[ actual government investment minus the expected level 
of government investment ] 
Here the presumption is that the infrastructure component of government in-
vestment is reflected more accurately in GINPE and GINPLT than the simple 
aggregate level of investment (GINP). Similar constructions were tested for 
government consumption and military expenditures in an effort to net out tran-
sitory expenditures from the longer run component of expenditures. The 
presumption here being that transitory fluctuations in expenditures were more 
likely to be inflationary than the longer run stable trend in expenditures. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Impact 9f infrastructure on the non-oil price deflater: 
(1) NODF = 0.83 NODFE + 2.42 INFWL + 0.005 Ml - 0.01 NOXNP 
(7.64) (5.00) (0.56) (-0.90) 
- 0.06 GINP + 0.07 DGINP - 0.42 RHO 
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(-2.73) (1.47) (-2.18) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 3531.1; DW = 2.27 
(2) NODF = 0.85 NODFE + 2.51INFWL+0.002 Ml - 0.13 NOXNP 
(7.60) (5.11) (0.27) (-0.65) 
- 0.07 GINPLT-0.002 GINPDLT- 0.42 RHO 
(-2.56) (-0.04) (-2.18) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 3380.2; DW = 2.25 
(3) NODF = 0.89 NODFE + 2.64 INFWL + 0.0003 Ml - 0.03 NOXNP 
(8.89) (5.27) (0.03) (-1.50) 
- 0.05 GINPE - 0.02 GINPELT- 0.33 RHO 
(-2.05) (-0.34) (-1.65) 
R2 - 0.999; F = 2770.5; DW = 2.13 
Impact of government consumption on the non-oil GDP deflater . 
(1') NODF = 0.94 NODFE + 2.10 INFWL + 0.007 Ml -0.07 NOXNP 
(24.87) (12.31) (-2.36) (-7.20) 
+ 0.09 GCNP - 0.06 DGC;NP - 0.82 RHO 
(7.75) (-5.80) (-6.90) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 17142.5; DW = 2.75 
(2') NODF = 0.87 NODFE + 1.81 INFWL + 0.006 Ml - 0.10 NOXNP 
(21.69) (12.79) (1.59) (-8.09) 
+ 0.10 GCNPLT + 0.02 GCNPDLT-0.81 RHO 
(8.54) (1.67) (-6.70) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 19191.1; DW = 2.19 
(3') NODF = 0.94 NODFE + 2.17 INFWL - 0.005 Ml - 0.09 NOXNP 
(29.19) (14.26) (-2.03) (-8.74) 
~ + 0.10 GCNPE + 0.04 GCNPELT-0.83 RHO 
(9.42) (3.75) (-7.10) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 22550.0; DW = 2.88 
Impact of military expenditures on the non-oil GDP deflater 
(1") NODF = 0.83 NODFE + 2.05 INFWL-0.002 Ml -0.04 NOXNP 
(12.00) (3.21) (-0.32) (-2.12) 
+ 0.06 GME - 0.11 DGME - 0.32 RHO 
(1. 78) (-2.88) 1 (-1.63) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 3304.9; DW = 2.08 
(2") NODF = 0.77 NODFE + 2.28 INFWL + 0.007 Ml - 0.06 NOXNP 
(12.29) (top.98) (1.08) (-3.35) 
+ 0.07 GMELT - 0.09 GMEDLT - 0.27 RHO 
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(2.20) (-2.36) (-1.31) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 3993.9; DW = 2.07 
(3") NODF = 0.81NODFE+2.02 INFWL - 0.001 Ml - 0.02 NOXNP 
(9.44) (2.65) (-0.15) (-1.12) 
+ 0.03 GMEE-0.04 GMEELT-0.16 RHO 
(0.70) (-0.79) (-0.75) 
R2 = 0.998; F = 1959.2; DW = 1.93 
Several interesting patterns appear in the results: 
7. It is clear that infrastructure investment in Saudi Arabia has reduced in-
flationary pressures. This conclusion holds for all three measures of 
the infrastructure component of government investment . 
8. The transitory (non-infrastructural) component of government invest-
ment does not appear to have contributed to inflationary pressures over 
the period examined (1960-85). 
9. World inflation has been imported into Saudi Arabia, and has con-
tributed significantly to increases in the non-oil GDP deflater. 
10. Contrary to the situation found in many other countries, the money 
supply does not appear to have made an independent contribution to in-
flation. 
11. Government consumption, however, appears to have made a major im-
pact on the price level. 
12. On the other hand, the inflationary impact of transitory government 
consumption appears to vary depending on how this variable is defined. 
13. Military expenditures appear to have a slight inflationary impact, al-
though the level of statistical significance is fairly low for this source 
Qf inflationary pressure. 
The importance of the composition of government expenditures is also il-
lustrated by the fact that the over-all level of government expenditures (GEP) 
in its various functional fonns is not statistically significant in affecting the 
non-oil deflater: 
(1 '") NODF = 0.84 NODFE + 1.90 INFWL - 0.008 Ml - 0.03 NOXNP 
(10.03) (3.72) (-1.01) (-1.21) 
+ 0.03 GEP - 0.03 DGEP -0.28 RHO 
(1.21) (-1.35) (-1.21) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 2226.2; DW = 1.78 
(2" ') NODF = 0.82 NODFE + 1.80 INFWL - 0.02 Ml - 0.05 NOXNP 
(10.81) (3.72) (-0.23) (-1.88) 
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+ 1.68 GEPLT - 0.001 GEPLDT - 0.33 RHO 
(1.68) (-0.07) (-1.65) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 2691.7; DW = 1.72 
(3" ') NODF = 0.84 NODFE + 1.91 INFWL - 0.008 Ml - 0.02 NOXNP 
(9.88) (3.68) (-0.91) (-1.03) 
+ 0.003 GEPE + 0.004 GEPELT - 0.28 RHO 
(1.04) (0.21) (-1.35) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 2163.5; DW = 1.80 
The results obtained using the consumer price index were very similar to those 
found for the non-oil GDP deflater, and hence do not appear to warrant fur-
ther discussion. 
One result obtained above that does warrant further discussion is the role 
played by real output increases (NOXNP). This variable is not significant in 
the regressions involving infrastructure. On the other hand this variable plays 
an important role in reducing inflationary pressures when included in the 
analysis of government consumption and military expenditures. Further 
analysis indicated that this result stemmed largely from the fact that infrastruc-
ture investment has a strong and positive impact on real non oil gdp (NOXNP) 
whereas government consumption and military expenditures do not (8). 
Using a distributed lag formulation (9) for non-oil GDP, it was assumed that 
real private investment (PINP), and the trend in real government revenues 
(GRPLT) produce a positive impact. The impact of government expenditures 
was then introduced (10). 
Operationally: 
NOXNP = f[NOXNPL (+), PINP (+), GRPLT (+), GEXP (+)] 
where: NOXNP = real non oil GDP 
·~ PINP =real private investment 
GRPL T = the trend in real government revenues 
GEXP = the trend in real government expenditures 
Impact of government investment on non -oil GDP 
NOXNP = 0.67 NOXNPL + 0.63 PINP + 0.04 GRPLT 
(13.35) (1.88) (1.47) 
+ 0.48 GINPLT - 0.58 RHO 
(8) A discussion of distributed lags and their properties are contained in Rao P. and R. 
Miller, 1971. 
(9) Operationally distributed lags are estimated by including the lagged value of the depen-
dent variable (NOXNPL) as an independent regressor. 
(10) To save space we present just the cases wi\h the trend in government expenditures. 
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(5.00) (-3.38) 
R2 = 0.998; F = 2581.3; DW = 2.52 
Impact of government consumption on non-oil GDP 
NOXNP = 1.00 NOXNPL + 0.55 PINP + 0.11 GRPLT 
(6.50) (1.05) (2.54) 
- 0.37 GCNPLT- 0.31 RHO 
(-1.35) (-1.57) 
R2 = 0.995; F = 908.2; DW - 2.01 
Impact of military expenditures on non-oil GDP 
NOXNP = 0.64 NOXNPL + 0.38 PINP - 0.006 GRPLT 
(5.87) (0.72) (-0.10) 
+ 0.61 GME - 0.24 RHO 
(1.72) (-1.17) 
R2 = 0.995; F = 925.4; DW = 1.88 
The timing of infrastructure's contribution to price stability is also of con-
siderable interest i.e. how much time elapsed between the time the post 1973/ 
74 investment boom and the point when infrastructure investment ceased to 
be inflationary and began to reduce over-all inflationary pressures? 
Using the linear trend (GINPLT) as the measure of infrastructural invest-
ment, and starting with the 1960-75 time interval, this transition appears to 
have begun around 1979: 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation, 1960 -1975 
(a) NODF = 0.89 NODFE + 0.11 INFWL + 0.06 Ml - 0.05 NOXNP 
(2.84) (0.12) (3.23) (-6.00) 
+ 0.09 GINPLT-0.12 RHO 
(2.54) (-0.42) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 1183.1; DW = 2.14 
Impact of infrastructure investment on inflation 1960-1976 
(b) NODF = 0.31 NODFE + 1.26 INFWL + 0.06 Ml - 0.06 NOXNP 
(2.46) (2.41) (3.60) (-6.70) 
+ 0.12 GINPLT + 0.43 RHO 
(3.31) (1.76) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 1918.0; DW = 1.66 
Impact of infrastructure investment on inflation 1960-1977 
(c) NODF = 0.83 NODFE + 3.46 INFWL - 0.01 Ml - 0.08 NOXNP 
(8.09) (14.92) (-1.19) (-8.61) 
+ 0.14 GINPLT- 0.48 RHO 
! 
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(4.89) (-2.09) 
R2 = 0.999; F= 5240.1; OW= 2.43 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-1978 
(d) NOOF = 0.74 NODFE + 3.26 INFWL - 0.002 Ml - 0.07 NOXNP 
(11.21) (21.75) (-0.43) (-8.31) 
+ 0.14 GINPLT- 0.44 RHO 
(4.71) (-1.89) 
R2 = 0.999; F= 8865.0; DW = 2.43 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-79 
(e) NOOF = 0.50 NODFE + 2.67 INFWL + 0.06 Ml -0.08 NOXNP 
(5.10) (9.14) (6.92) (-5.14) 
- 0.15 GINPLT + 0.78 RHO 
(-4.41) (5.01) 
R2 = 0.999; F= 498.9; OW = 2.23 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-80 
(t) NOOF = 0.33 NOOFE + 3.01 INFWL + 0.06 Ml - 0.05 NOXNP 
(2.82) (8.33) (5.10) (-2.88) 
-0.13 GINPLT + 0.62 RHO 
(-2.88) (3.27) 
R2 = 0.999; F= 617.5; OW= 1.74 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-81 
(g) NOOF = 1.03 NODFE + 3.08 INFWL - 0.02 Ml - 0.03 NOXNP 
(7.99) (8.06) (-1.26) (-1.81) 
-0.01GINPLT-0.62 RHO 
(-0.26) (~3.41) 
R2 = 0.999; F= 3432.2; DW = 2.34 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-82 
(h) NOOF = 0.92 NODFE + 2.86 INFWL - 0.006 Ml - 0.03 NOXNP 
(16.06) (9.48) (-0.96) (-1.56) 
- 0.05 GINPLT - 0.68 RHO 
(-1.38) (-4.09) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 4655.5; OW = 2.24 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-83 
(i) NOOF = 0.86 NOOFE + 2.43 INFWL + 0.003 Ml - 0.04 NOXNP 
(12.37) (7.39) (0.40) (-2.22) 
-0.09 GINPLT- 0.47 RHO 
(-2.22) (-2.42) 
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R2 = 0.999; F = 3234.9; DW = 2.23 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-84 
(j) NODF = 0.85 NODFE + 2.47 INFWL + 0.003 Ml - 0.07 NOXNP 
(12.97) (8.55) (0.40) (-0.56) 
- 0.08 GINPLT - 0.48 RHO 
(-2.51) (-2.56) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 4071.6; DW = 2.33 
Impact of infrastructure on inflation 1960-85 
(k) NODF = 0.84 NODFE + 2.48 INFWL + 0.003 Ml - 0.01 NOXNP 
(12.62) (8.40) (0.36) (-0.96) 
- 0.07 GINPLT - 0.42 RHO 
(-2.65) (2.17) 
R2 = 0.999; F = 4322.5; DW = 2.26 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is fairly safe to conclude that the Saudi Arabian development strategy, 
based largely on the assumptions of a Hirschman type infrastructure led 
growth program, has been successful in achieving its main aims: achieving 
non-inflationary increases in non-oil income. This strategy began paying fair-
ly high dividends around 1979, and has enabled the country to sustain fairly 
respectable growth rates even during the current period of slack oil revenues. 
Ultimately, however the results presented here raise more questions as to the 
wisdom of the country's development strategy than perhaps they answer. 
It is not at all clear, for example, how long past infrastructure investments 
will be able to sustain the growth momentum built up in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Will new, albeit, smaller additions to the stock of infrastructure 
caused by depressed oil markets be sufficient to sustain growth? Or, on the 
other hand, irrespective of its extent will further additions to the stock of in-
frastructure continue to have the same productivity in contributing to growth 
and inflation reduction as past investments? Or has the country reached the 
point where diminishing returns to further increases to the stock of infrastruc-
ture have been reached? If this is the case, what other strategies are available 
to replace infrastructural investment as a source of non-inflationary growth? 
Clearly answers to these questions are necessary before any complete assess-
ment of the wisdom of the country's post 1973 development experience can 
be made. 
